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Abstract
In 2001, government guarantees for savings banks in Germany were removed following a law suit.
We use this natural experiment to examine the eﬀect of government guarantees on bank risk taking,
using a large data set of matched bank/borrower information. The results suggest that banks whose
government guarantee was removed reduced credit risk by cutting oﬀ the riskiest borrowers from
credit. At the same time, the banks also increased interest rates on their remaining borrowers. The
eﬀects are economically large: the Z-Score of average borrowers increased by 7.5% and the average
loan size declined by 17.2%. Remaining borrowers paid 46 basis points higher interest rates, despite
their higher quality. Using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach we show that the eﬀect is larger for
banks that ex ante beneﬁted more from the guarantee and that none of these eﬀects are present in
a control group of German banks to whom the guarantee was not applicable. Furthermore, savings
banks adjusted their liabilities away from risk-sensitive debt instruments after the removal of the
guarantee, while we do not observe this for the control group. We also document in an event study
that yield spreads of savings banks’ bonds increased signiﬁcantly right after the announcement of the
decision to remove guarantees, while the yield spread of a sample of bonds issued by the control group
remained unchanged. The results suggest that public guarantees may be associated with substantial
moral hazard eﬀects.
JEL Classiﬁcation: G21, G28, G32
Key words: banking, public guarantees, credit risk, moral hazard, market discipline5
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Non-technical summary 
Public guarantees in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007/2008 have been widespread. 
Most countries either nationalized banks, provided blanked guarantees for the banking system 
or both. Evidence on the likely effect of such intervention on bank risk taking is scarce, as in 
most cases guarantees are granted in the midst of a crisis, in which case the effects of the 
guarantees on the portfolio risk of banks are confounded by the effects of the crisis itself on 
portfolio risk of banks. To disentangle the two is very difficult in such a setting. In this paper 
we do not consider the introduction of government guarantees, but rather their removal. 
Further, the removal was not prompted by a financial event, but exogenously imposed by a 
court decision. The period under consideration in this paper, 1996 to 2006, was a period 
without major financial system incidence for the banks in our sample and hence is particularly 
well suited to identify the effects of behavioral changes in response to changes in the safety 
net.
In 2001, government guarantees for savings banks in Germany were removed following a law 
suit. We use this natural experiment to empirically identify the effect of government 
guarantees on bank risk taking, using a large data set of matched bank/borrower information. 
The results suggest that banks whose government guarantee was removed reduced credit risk 
by cutting off the riskiest borrowers from credit. At the same time, the banks also increased 
interest rates on their remaining borrowers and reduced the average loan size. The effects are 
economically large: the Z-Score of average borrowers increased by 7.5% and the average loan 
size declined by 17.2%. Remaining borrowers paid 46 basis points higher interest rates, 
despite their higher quality. Using a difference-in-differences approach we show that the 
effect is larger for banks that ex ante benefited more from the guarantee. We proxy for banks 
that benefited more by distinguishing between ex ante riskier and ex ante safer savings banks. 
We also show that in a control group of German banks to whom the guarantee was not 
applicable credit risk increased in the period subsequent to the removal of the guarantee. This 
is consistent with a deterioration in overall borrower quality in Germany during the period. 
Furthermore, savings banks adjusted their liabilities away from risk-sensitive debt instruments 
and towards insured deposits and equity after the removal of the guarantee, while we do not 
observe this for the control group. We also document in an event study that yield spreads of 
savings banks' bonds increased significantly right after the announcement of the decision to 6
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remove guarantees, while the yield spread of a sample of bonds issued by the control group 
remained unchanged.  
Finally, given the richness of our dataset, we can distinguish whether banks reduced credit 
risk by tightening lending standards for new borrowers (“screening”) or by better monitoring 
of existing borrowers. We find that the credit quality of both existing and new borrowers 
improves, but the improvements are significantly larger in the case of new borrowers. This 
finding is consistent with a tightening of lending standards after the removal of guarantees. 
Overall, the results suggest that public guarantees may be associated with substantial moral 
hazard effects. The unique identification scheme permits us to establish a causal relationship 
between public guarantees and banks’ risk taking. The findings of this paper have important 
policy implications: The results suggest that a credible removal of guarantees will be essential 
in reducing the risk of potential future financial instability. They also support recent initiatives 
to impose capital surcharges on the largest banking institutions, which may benefit either 
from an explicit or an implicit guarantee.  Higher capital in these banks may help offset the 
incentives provided by the public guarantees imposed during the crisis. 7
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1 Introduction
In this paper we empirically analyze the impact of public guarantees on the risk taking
of banks in the context of a natural experiment. Until the year 2000 the German savings
banks were protected by a federal government guarantee.1 In July 2001 the European
Union, based on the outcome of a lawsuit at the European Court of Justice, ordered
that the guarantees be discontinued, as they were deemed to be in violation of European
anti-subsidy rules.2 Using a unique panel data set consisting of matched balance sheet
information for all German savings banks and their commercial loan customers for 1996
to 2006, we estimate the eﬀect the removal had on credit risk, loan volumes, and interest
rates of savings banks. Taking advantage of this natural experiment we are able to identify
the eﬀect of government guarantees on banks’ credit portfolio choices and risk taking.
We ﬁnd that the removal of government guarantees resulted in a signiﬁcant reduc-
tion in banks’ exposure to credit risk. Exposure to credit risk decreased signiﬁcantly more
in banks, for which the value of guarantees was higher ex ante. Savings banks shifted their
portfolios towards safer borrowers by dropping existing borrowers with higher credit risk
and by tightening their lending standards for new borrowers. Loan sizes were reduced. De-
spite the reduction in credit risk, savings banks increased interest rates on the remaining
customers. Using a control group of banks that was unaﬀected by the removal, we ﬁnd in
a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation that these eﬀects do not exist for the control group.3
We then check whether the reduction in credit risk can be related to an increase in market
discipline after the removal of the guarantee. We show that savings banks shifted their
liabilities away from risk-sensitive debt. Further, interest yields of savings bank bonds
increased around the time of the announcement of the removal in July of 2001, while the
1We provide more detail on the institutional structure of German savings banks in Section 2.
2Several major newspapers commented on the court decision. See for example Financial Times “Solution to Five-year
Battle Welcomed by Private Sector” and Wall Street Journal “Germany to End State Guarantees for Public Banks”, both
on 18 July, 2001.
3Indeed, we tend to ﬁnd an increase in borrower credit risk in the years after the removal of guarantees for the control
group, due to the recession in Germany in 2002/2003 (Figure 2). Hence, in an environment of deteriorating quality of loan
applicants, the quality of those that were granted a loan by savings banks improved signiﬁcantly. Consistent with this, the
market share of savings banks in the lending business to non-ﬁnancials fell from 22% to 21% after the removal (Figure 3).8
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yields of bonds of a control group does not change. Taken together we feel we can establish
a causal relationship between the removal of guarantees and the reduction in risk taking
of savings banks, consistent with signiﬁcant moral hazard eﬀects of public guarantees.
Public guarantees in the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007/2008 have been wide-
spread. Most countries either nationalized banks (e.g., U.S.: Indy Mac, Fannie Mae,
Freddy Mac; UK: Bradford Bingley, Northern Rock, RBS, HBOS, Lloyds; Germany: IKB,
Hypo Real Estate; Belgium/Netherlands: Dexia, Fortis), provided blanked guarantees for
the banking system (e.g., Germany, Italy) or both. Evidence on the likely eﬀect of such
intervention on bank risk taking is scarce, as in most cases guarantees are granted in
the midst of a crisis, in which case the eﬀects of the guarantees on the portfolio risk of
banks are confounded by the eﬀects of the crisis itself on portfolio risk of banks. To
disentangle the two is very diﬃcult in such a setting. In this paper we do not consider the
introduction of government guarantees, but rather their removal. Further, the removal
was not prompted by a ﬁnancial event, but exogenously imposed by a court decision.
The period under consideration in this paper, 1996 to 2006, was a period without major
ﬁnancial system incidence in Germany and hence is particularly well suited to identify the
eﬀects of behavioral changes in response to changes in the safety net.4
Theory would tell us that there are two eﬀects of public guarantees on bank risk
taking that work in opposite directions. On the one hand, government guarantees may
reduce market discipline because creditors anticipate their bank’s bail-out and therefore
have lower incentives to monitor the bank’s risk-taking or to demand risk premia for
higher observed risk-taking (Flannery, 1998; Sironi, 2003; Gropp et al., 2006). This tends
to increase the protected banks’ risk-taking. The eﬀect is similar to the well-known moral
hazard eﬀect discussed in the deposit insurance literature (Merton, 1977; Ruckes, 2004).
If depositors are protected by a guarantee, they will punish their bank less for risk-taking,
reducing market discipline. On the other hand, government guarantees also aﬀect banks’
4This is not to say that there were no ﬁnancial incidents at all; rather the eﬀects of the Russian default (1998), LTCM
(1998), or the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 on German savings banks were very mild (Hackethal and Schmidt, 2005).9
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risk-taking through their eﬀect on banks’ margins and charter values. Keeley (1990) was
the ﬁrst to argue that higher charter values decrease the incentives for risk-taking, because
the threat of losing future rents acts as a deterrent. Government bail-out guarantees result
in higher charter values for protected banks who beneﬁt from lower reﬁnancing costs.
Hence, government guarantees may alternatively be viewed as an implicit subsidy to the
banks and through their future value decrease bank risk taking.
Ultimately, as argued by Cordella and Yeyati (2003) and by Hakenes and Schnabel
(2010), the net eﬀect of government bail-out guarantees on the risk-taking of banks is
ambiguous and depends on the relative importance of the two channels. Which dominates
is an empirical matter.5
Empirically, the literature tends to conclude that banks increase their risk-taking
in the presence of government guarantees, but the evidence is far from unambiguous. For
example, Hovakimian and Kane (2000) show evidence for higher risk-taking of banks in the
presence of deposit insurance. Large banks – which may be perceived to be “too big to fail”
– have been shown to follow riskier strategies than smaller banks (Boyd and Runkle, 1993;
Boyd and Gertler, 1994; Gropp et al., 2010). The ﬁndings on the relationship between
bank size and failure probabilities are mixed. De Nicol´ o (2001) and De Nicol´ o et al.
(2004) document higher probabilities of failure for larger banks. In contrast, De Nicol´ o
and Loukoianova (2007) ﬁnd that public banks do not appear to follow riskier strategies
than private banks. Finally, Sapienza (2004) shows that public banks charge lower interest
rates for given riskiness of loans, which is consistent with the results presented in this
paper.
The evidence on the eﬀect of government bail-out guarantees on overall banking
system stability is also mixed. Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) present evidence
for a destabilizing eﬀect of deposit insurance. Similarly, some papers ﬁnd a negative rela-
tionship between bank stability and government ownership (Caprio and Mart´ ınez Per´ ıa,
5The presence of government guarantees may not only aﬀect the risk-taking of protected banks, but also – through
competition – that of the protected banks’ competitors (Gropp et al., 2010).10
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2000) or bank concentration (De Nicol´ o et al., 2004). However, there also exist papers
that are consistent with no or even a stabilizing eﬀect of government guarantees. Barth
et al. (2004) show that government ownership has no robust impact on bank fragility,
once one controls for banking regulation and supervisory practices. Beck et al. (2006) ﬁnd
that systemic banking crises are less likely in countries with more concentrated banking
sectors.
Most of these papers rely on cross-country or cross-sectional variation in public
guarantees to identify their eﬀect. In contrast, in this paper we are able to take advantage
of a unique natural experiment within one country for a homogeneous set of relatively
small banks. We view the small size of the banks in our sample (mean total assets of
Euro 1.8 billion, see Section 6) as an advantage. If public guarantees were removed for
a set of very large banks, these banks may remain “too big to fail” and therefore still be
subject to an implicit government guarantee, rather than an explicit one (Gropp et al.,
2010). Further, we use the link between banks and their customers in the data to obtain
a precise measure of bank risk taking.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two gives some insti-
tutional background on German savings banks and describes the events surrounding the
removal of public guarantees. A description of the data set and some descriptive statistics
can be found in Section three. Section four presents our empirical strategy and Section
ﬁve and six present the baseline results. Section seven gives a number of extensions and
robustness checks. Section eight concludes.
2 Institutional background
The German banking market is almost evenly split between three sets of banks: the savings
bank sector (the focus of this paper), the cooperatives bank sector (“Volks- und Raiﬀeisen-
banken”), and commercial banks.6 It is characterized by a low level of concentration with
6For an in depth description of the German banking market see Hackethal (2004).11
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452 savings banks, more than 1,000 credit cooperatives (many of them extremely small),
and around 300 privately owned commercial banks.
Taken as a group, savings banks in Germany have more than Euro 1 trillion in total
assets and 22,000 branches. German savings banks focus on traditional banking business
with virtually no oﬀ-balance sheet operations. Their main ﬁnancing source are customer
deposits, which they transform into loans to households and small and medium sized enter-
prises.7 Savings banks are owned by the local government of the community they operate
in. One important diﬀerence between commercial banks and savings banks is that savings
banks in Germany are obliged by law to serve the “common good” of their community
by providing households and local ﬁrms with easy access to credit. They do not compete
with each other, as a regional separation applies: each savings bank uniquely serves its
local market (similar to the geographic banking restrictions that existed up to the 1990s
in the U.S.). Each savings bank is aﬃliated with one federal state bank (“Landesbank”)
and each federal state bank is aﬃliated with a state (“Bundesland”) or group of states.
The aﬃliated savings banks own each a part of their federal state bank. The federal state
banks act as regional clearing houses for liquidity and facilitate the transfer of liquidity
from savings banks with excess liquidity to those with liquidity shortfalls. In addition, the
federal state banks secure market funding through the issuance of bonds. Federal state
banks are largely internationally operating wholesale and investment banks (they are not
allowed to lend to individuals, for example) and hence follow a fundamentally diﬀerent
business model from savings banks (Hau and Thum, 2009; Puri et al., 2010). They are
not included in this paper.
Despite their obligation to serve the “common good”, the saving banks in our
sample are on average relatively proﬁtable: average pre-tax ROE is 12.8%. The average
cost to income ratio is 82.1%. Despite the diﬀerences in governance, savings banks appear
very similar to private commercial banks of comparable size in continental Europe. Pre-
7Savings banks also issue some covered bonds and certiﬁcates of deposits that have characteristics similar to subordinated
debt (Hackethal, 2004). We use yield data on these bonds in Section 6.3 below.12
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tax ROE of commercial banks is 12.1% in continental Europe and 13.1% in the UK (317
banks, 1996-2004, data is from Bankscope). Similarly, cost to income ratios are 80.1%
in continental Europe and 66.8% in the UK. Overall, they look like a fairly typical and
moderately ineﬃcient small commercial bank in continental Europe.
Until the year 2000, the entire savings bank sector was protected by government
guarantees (“Gewaehrtraegerhaftung”). As savings banks compete with commercial banks
for retail and commercial customers, commercial banks in Germany alleged that the gov-
ernment guarantees resulted in a signiﬁcant competitive advantage for savings banks.
Prompted by these allegations, the European Union ﬁled a lawsuit against the govern-
ment guarantees at the European Court of Justice in 2000. The subsequent decision on
July 17, 2001 resulted in the removal of guarantees for savings banks and federal state
banks in two steps: during a transition period from July 18, 2001 to July 18, 2005, newly
contracted obligations (such as bonds or commercial paper) continue to be secured by
government guarantees if their maturity is shorter than December 31, 2015. In a second
step, starting from July 18, 2005 all newly contracted obligations will no longer be cov-
ered. Obligations contracted before July 18, 2001 are grandfathered. This implies that
our sample largely covers the transition period between the full existence of the guarantees
(until 2001) and their complete removal (2005). Hence, we check the extent to which the
expectation of their complete removal aﬀected bank behavior.8
3 Data
3.1 Main data sources
We use a proprietary data set provided by the German Savings Banks Association for the
years 1996 to 2006 which symmetrically spans the removal of government guarantees in
8Technically, the “Gewaehrtraegerhaftung” and the “Anstaltslast” were abolished. The “Anstaltslast” describes the
obligation of the government to provide all state-owned enterprises with “suﬃcient resources to carry out their tasks”. In
that sense the savings banks considered in this paper could technically not become insolvent before 2001. In the change
in legislation of 2001 it explicitly stipulates that federal state banks and savings banks from then on have the “ability to
become insolvent”.13
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2001. The data set provides annual balance sheets and income statements of all commercial
loan customers of all 452 German savings banks aﬃliated with the German Savings Banks
Association.9 It includes data of 87,702 customers after excluding missing values and
requiring at least two consecutive observations in order to be able to use lagged variables
in the empirical analysis. In total there are 230,562 observations in the data set. Hence,
there are around 2.6 annual observations per customer on average. The borrowers are
largely small and medium sized enterprises with an average of Euro 1.6 million in total
assets. They strongly rely on bank loans as the mean loan ratio, i.e. total loan volume
divided by total assets is equal to 51%.
To control for savings bank characteristics, we also use annual balance sheets for
the 452 savings banks. The savings bank data is also from the German Savings Banks
Association. By using this proprietary data set, the sample size is much larger than by
using public sources. In order to ensure some degree of anonymity of customers, the
matching of borrowers to savings banks is possible only aggregated in groups of 5-12
savings banks. In total, there are 65 savings bank groups. Hence, while we have precise
information on the individual customer, we only know that the customer banked with any
one of the group. We thus link the customer characteristics to the average of the group
of savings banks, rather than to an individual savings bank.
In addition to the detailed borrower/bank matched data set, we also use a bank
level data set that includes the savings banks and as a control group all other banks in
Germany for which we could obtain data in Bankscope. In particular, we include bank
holding companies, commercial banks, cooperative banks, and medium and long term
credit banks.10
9There are seven savings banks that are not full members in the savings banks association. They are not covered in the
data set.
10Refer to Section 6 for a further description of the bank level data set.14
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3.1.1 Dependent variables
Table 1 provides the deﬁnitions and data sources of all variables we use. As a measure for
the credit risk at the borrower level we use the Z-Score (Altman, 1968) calibrated to the
German banking market (Engelmann et al., 2003):11
Z Score =0 .717 ∗ Working capital/Assets +0 .847 ∗ Retained earnings/Assets+
3.107 ∗ Net profits/Assets +0 .420 ∗ Net worth/Liabilities +0 .998 ∗ Sales/Assets
A higher Z Score indicates a lower risk associated with the borrower. It is important
to emphasize that we calculate the Z-Score based on borrower data. We do not rely on
internal credit risk indicators of the savings banks themselves. The internal assessment
may be problematic, as savings banks may have incentives to review their internal ratings
of borrowers after the removal of government guarantees.
Loan size are the borrower’s liabilities towards the savings bank. As savings banks
are prohibited from competing with each other, borrowers in a certain region are able to
obtain loans only from the local savings bank. In case a borrower has several loans out-
standing at the reporting date, our proxy for loan size is the total loan volume outstanding
to the customer.
We approximate borrower level interest rates from the borrowers’ balance sheets
as interest expenses over total loan volume. The loan volume of borrowers may, however,
also contain loans from the savings banks’ competitors. Hence, we only include data
from commercial borrowers with more than 50% share of total loan volumes from savings
banks.12 Interest rate spread is then calculated as the diﬀerence between the savings
banks loan interest rate and the risk-free rate. We use the annual return of ﬁve-year
German government bonds as the risk-free rate (taken from the German central bank)
11We replace EBIT by Net profits due to better data availability.
12Results remain qualitatively the same if we use an alternative cutoﬀ value of 100% (Section 5.1).15
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since the term to maturity of the average loan is between four and ﬁve years (information
taken from savings banks’ balance sheets).
3.1.2 Independent variables
In the baseline analysis, the central variable of interest is NoStateG which is a dummy
variable distinguishing between the period when savings banks enjoyed a public guarantee
(1996 to 2000) and the period when they did not (2001 to 2006). We set the post 2001
period equal to one.13 Hence, the dummy divides the period of observation into two parts
of almost equal size and measures whether bank behavior changed after the removal of
public guarantees in 2001.
As we can link borrowers to groups of savings banks, we use a number of bank
group level variables to control for bank group level heterogeneity. For example, we use
the savings bank groups’ total assets, Total bank assets, to control for a variety of the-
ories related to bank size. Demsetz and Strahan (1997), among others, emphasize that
larger banks can more easily diversify. In our setting, this implies that larger banks are
able to lend to individually riskier borrowers without increasing overall portfolio risk. In
the speciﬁcation with Z Score as the dependent variable, diversiﬁcation would imply a
negative coeﬃcient for Total bank assets. Similarly, Acharya et al. (2006), using a data
set of individual loan customers, show that diversiﬁcation tends to result in higher risk at
the individual loan level. They argue that this increase in risk at the individual loan level
stems from a decline in monitoring by larger banks. Monitoring declines, because agency
problems within banks (between management and loan oﬃcers) may increase with bank
size (Stein, 2002; Goetz, 2010).
At the same time, large banks may enjoy economies of scale in lending (Berger
and Mester, 1997). In a competitive environment, these cost savings may be passed on
13Although the ﬁnal court decision was in July 2001, we use the 2001 data for the post removal sample as we mainly have
year-end ﬁnancial statements data.16
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to borrowers in the form of lower interest rates. Hence, this would suggest a negative
coeﬃcient of Total bank assets in the Interest rate spread speciﬁcation. Finally, Berger
et al. (2005) show that larger banks tend to lend to larger borrowers. If larger borrowers
ultimately obtain larger loans, we would expect a positive coeﬃcient of Total bank assets
in the Loan size speciﬁcation.
Downgrade is the number of numerical notches, the federal state bank a savings
bank belongs to, is downgraded after the removal of guarantees. As savings banks in
part own the federal state banks, a revaluation of their equity stake after the removal
of guarantees may aﬀect their lending behavior and/or their willingness to take risk.
We control for the regional level of competition (Boyd and De Nicol´ o, 2005), Direct
competition, by using the ratio of branches of direct competitors (commercial banks and
cooperative banks) to savings banks branches per group of savings banks and year. The
data comes from the Bundesbank.14 In line with Keeley (1990) and Dick (2006), we expect
that banks lend more aggressively in more competitive markets (higher risk, larger loan
size and lower interest rates). Further, Number mergers contains the number of mergers
within a group of savings banks per year and controls for potential eﬀects that merged
banks tend to weaken bank/ﬁrm relationships, which may aﬀect loan conditions (Di Patti
and Gobbi, 2007).15
GDP per capita is the level of GDP per capita per group of savings banks and
controls for demand eﬀects as well as for diﬀerences in regional economic development.
We further control for relative changes in business climate, Δ Ifo index, by using the
annual change in the Ifo index which is published on the national level by the Ifo Institute
for Economic Research. Indebtedness is the average debt per capita of the community that
the savings bank is located in. With this variable we attempt to control for diﬀerences in
the ﬁnancial strength of the savings banks’ owners.16 Both variables come from the federal
14The data covers the year 1996-2004. Thus, as the data ends too early, we assume that competition remained unchanged
in 2005/2006 and use the 2004 data in these two years.
15However, Berger et al. (1998) provide evidence that reduced small business lending is oﬀset by the reactions of other
banks.
16Recall that all savings banks are at least in part owned by the local community it operates in.17
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statistical oﬃce of Germany (“Destatis”). In addition, we employ Risk-free interest rate,
which is the average daily risk-free interest rate at the national level (Bundesbank data),
in order to control for the relationship between interest rates and credit risk. We also
use 16 sectoral dummies following the two-digit classiﬁcation of industries by the federal
statistical oﬃce of Germany.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables that we use. The ﬁrst three variables
will serve as dependent variables in the regressions below. The average Z-Score is 2.5 with
a 5% percentile of 0.2 and a 95% percentile of 6.1. On average, borrowers have loans from
savings banks of Euro 530,000 outstanding. The median amount outstanding is Euro
215,000. The average interest rate spread is 6.7% with a standard deviation of 19.7%.
Total bank assets per group of savings banks are Euro 15.3 billion on average.
The 5% percentile is Euro 5.5 million while the 95% percentile is Euro 39.2 billion.17
On average, federal state banks were downgraded by two and a half rating notches after
the removal of state guarantees, which gives a ﬁrst glimpse of the impact of the removal
of public guarantees on the assessment of rating agencies (note that the overwhelming
majority of savings banks are not rated by major rating agencies). The number of direct
competitors is less than one on average, indicating a rather low level of competition. On
average, the savings bank groups were involved in 24% of the years with a merger. The
GDP per capita is Euro 25,200 on average and the relative change in business climate (Ifo-
index) is one point (the Ifo-index was 100 points in the year 2000). Local communities
the savings banks were operating in were indebted by Euro 1,040 per capita on average
and average daily interest rates were 3% on an annual basis during our sample period.
As a ﬁrst cut at how the removal of government guarantees aﬀected the banks’ risk
taking, we compare the means of the dependent variables with and without the guaran-
17To account for outliers, we winsorize the ﬁrst four variables on the 0.5%/99.5% level.18
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tees in place. The average Z-Score increased by 0.20 from 2.36 in 1996/2000 to 2.56 in
2001/2006 (i.e. by 8.5%), which is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Hence, we observe a shift
towards an improvement in the average borrower quality after guarantees were removed.
Figure 1 further illustrates this point. It shows that savings banks reduced lending to com-
mercial customers with a Z-Score between 1.0 and 3.0 in favor for less risky clients with a
higher Z-Score (3.5 and above). It appears that the savings banks tried to reduce largely
the proportion of very risky borrowers in their portfolios. Savings banks also reduced loan
sizes to individual borrowers by Euro 78,000 or 13.4% and charged higher interest rates
spreads. On average, savings banks increased interest rate margins by 112 basis points or
18.8%. Both diﬀerences in means are signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
4 Empirical strategy
We are interested in the eﬀect of government guarantees on bank behavior. Recall the
two main predictions that we take from the literature. First, if the moral hazard eﬀect
of guarantees dominates, we would expect banks to reduce their risk taking after the
removal of the guarantees (Flannery, 1998; Sironi, 2003; Gropp et al., 2006). Second, if
the charter value eﬀect, that is the implicit subsidy, dominates, we would expect savings
banks to increase their risk taking (Keeley, 1990). Changing risk taking due to the removal
of government guarantees would then be reﬂected in decreasing (moral hazard eﬀect) or
increasing (charter value eﬀect) lending to riskier borrowers. The predictions for interest
rates charged are ambiguous. If the moral hazard eﬀect dominates, we would expect
interest rates charged not to decline on the pool of borrowers left after the removal of
guarantees, consistent with ﬁndings that public ﬁrms tend to charge lower interest rates
for a given level of riskiness (Sapienza, 2004). If the charter value eﬀect dominates, we
would expect interest rates not to increase after the removal. We think the ability to
control for the level of interest rates charged is a strength of the paper, because it permits19
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us to control for changes in risk premia charged by banks when examining changes in the
risk of borrowers. If any change in the riskiness of banks’ customers was associated with a
corresponding change in risk premia charged, it would be diﬃcult to draw ﬁrm conclusions
on the overall risk incurred by banks.
The removal of the guarantees took place in 2001, in the middle of our observation
period. One major advantage of our data set is that the removal was exogenously imposed
by a court decision and thus creates a unique natural experiment. We ﬁrst consider
whether we can detect any diﬀerences in the Z-Scores, loan sizes, and interest rates charged
to borrowers before and after 2001, controlling for bank group characteristics and local
economic conditions, and thus identify the eﬀect of the removal by the time series variation
only. In particular, we use the three dependent variables on the borrower level i at
time t: Z Score(i,t), Loan size(i,t), and Interest rate spread(i,t). To account for the
simultaneity of the risk, loan size, and interest rate decisions by banks we use a seemingly
unrelated regression (SUR) model:
Z Score(i,t)=α1 + β1 NoStateG(t)+γ11 X1(g,t)+γ21 X2(i,t)+γ31 X3(t)+ε1(i,t)
Loan size(i,t)=α2 + β2 NoStateG(t)+γ12 X1(g,t)+γ22 X2(i,t)+γ32 X3(t)+ε2(i,t) (1)
Interest rate spread(i,t)=α3 + β3 NoStateG(t)+γ13 X1(g,t)+γ23 X2(i,t)+γ33 X3(t)+ε3(i,t)
where the variable of interest is NoStateG(t). It is a dummy variable distinguishing
between 1996 to 2000 (equals zero) and 2001 to 2006 (equals one). The vector X1(g,t)
includes bank group level variables, g, such as savings bank assets at the group level, the
downgrade severity of the corresponding federal state bank, local banking competition,
local savings bank merger history, local GDP per capita, and the debt per capita per
group of savings banks. X2(i,t) includes a full set of two-digit industry dummies which
are on the borrower level i. X3(t) is a vector of variables that vary only in the time series,
such as the change in the business climate and the annual average of daily risk-free interest20
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rates. The SUR model allows for a correlated error structure across the error terms of the
three equations. We estimate all speciﬁcations with cluster robust standard errors at the
savings bank group level, thus allowing for unobserved correlation between observations
from the same savings bank group (Froot, 1989).
We explore diﬀerent ways to deal with simultaneity of our dependent variables in
unreported robustness checks. One, we lag the independent variables Z Score(i,t − 1),
Loan size(i,t − 1), and Interest rate spread(i,t − 1) by one year, include two of them
as further independent variables (Acharya et al., 2006), and run three independent bank
group ﬁxed eﬀects regressions as well as three pooled OLS regressions. Second, we omit
these independent variables from the regressions and run three independent pooled OLS
regressions. All results reported below are robust to these alternative speciﬁcations.18
5 Results
5.1 Baseline results
While we found the univariate results in Section 3.2 encouraging, it is possible, for instance,
that the eﬀects are due to regional diﬀerences across local markets. Hence, in Table 3
we present the baseline results for the three dependent variables Z Score, Loan size,
and Interest rate spread using speciﬁcation (1), controlling for a host of local market
characteristics. The variable of interest is NoStateG, which takes the value one for the
period after the removal of government guarantees (2001 to 2006) and zero before.
Table 3 shows the results from speciﬁcation (1). We ﬁnd that the NoStateG coef-
ﬁcient is positive (lower risk) and signiﬁcant at any signiﬁcance level in the ﬁrst column.
The commercial loan customers of savings banks exhibited lower risk in the period after
the removal of the government guarantee. The coeﬃcient is 0.176 and thus almost as large
as in the comparison of unconditional means. The average borrower has an 7.5% higher
18These results and those of the following robustness checks are available from the authors upon request.21
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Z-Score after the removal of government guarantees than before. This diﬀerence indicates
not only a statistically signiﬁcant but also an economically relevant reduction in credit
risk.
In the second column we show that NoStateG also enters signiﬁcantly (1% level)
in the regression for loan size. We ﬁnd that savings banks signiﬁcantly reduced loan sizes
after the removal of government guarantees. The average reduction is economically large
at Euro 100,000 or 17.2%. Further, we ﬁnd that interest rate spreads charged (column 3)
were signiﬁcantly increased (at the 1% level). However, the average increase is 46 basis
points or 7.7%, smaller than the 112 basis points in the univariate analysis, suggesting that
regional diﬀerences matter for interest rate spreads charged. Both ﬁndings corroborate our
main ﬁnding: Savings banks signiﬁcantly reduced their risk taking after the government
guarantees were removed.
Most control variables conform to expectations. If the savings banks’ communities
were more indebted, credit risk was higher. Borrowers tend to be less risky and are
charged higher interest rate spreads in regions with higher GDP per capita. We ﬁnd a
positive relationship between changes in the business climate and Z-Score and a negative
relationship with the interest rate spread, and with the loan size. Higher competition
yields riskier lending, which is consistent with the charter value eﬀect (Keeley, 1990),
but is unrelated to loan size and interest rate spread. Low overall levels of interest rates
in the economy result in safer borrowers, smaller loans and higher interest rate spreads.
Larger banks tend to originate larger loans even though this coeﬃcient does not enter
signiﬁcantly. However, bank size is not related to the level of credit risk and interest rate
spreads. We further ﬁnd evidence that savings banks in regions where the federal state
bank was downgraded more severely had a lower level of credit risk and charged a lower
interest rate spread.
We next discuss the results of a series of additional tests to illustrate the robustness
of our ﬁndings. One, using savings bank group ﬁxed eﬀects leaves the results qualitatively22
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unchanged. In particular, the coeﬃcient on NoStateG still enters signiﬁcantly (at the 1%
level) in all three regressions with the credit risk, the loan size, and the interest rate spread
as dependent variables. Results thus seem to be robust to controlling for time-invariant
saving bank group heterogeneity.
Second, it seems plausible that savings banks may have expected the law suit to go
against them and wanted to extend as many risky loans under the old regime. If so, this
may imply that they increased their lending to risky borrowers after the law suit was ﬁled
in April 2000 and stopped after the law suit was decided in July 2001. We thus perform
a robustness check with the years 2000 and 2001 dropped. The number of observations
decreases from 230,562 to 168,006. Unreported results regarding the NoStateG coeﬃcient
remain qualitatively unchanged. Our ﬁndings hence do not seem to be driven by savings
banks increasing risk levels shortly before the court decision in combination with a decline
in risk levels in 2001.
Third, we vary the sample selection criteria. In the baseline, we include a com-
mercial borrowers in the data set if more than 50% of the total loan volume comes from
savings banks. As a robustness check, we include a ﬁrm as a customer only if all bank
loans come from savings banks. When doing this, the number of observations declines to
103,407. Again, the NoStateG coeﬃcients enter signiﬁcantly in the SUR regression for all
three dependent variables.
Fourth, we decompose the Z-Score and analyze the ﬁve components separately for
the time before and after the removal of the public guarantees. It is possible that the
change in the Z-Score after 2001 was dominated by the change in only one or two of its
components, raising the possibility that at least part of our ﬁndings is spurious. We ﬁnd
that four of the ﬁve components move into the direction of less risk. Further the diﬀerence
between the respective component before and after the removal is signiﬁcant at least at the
10% level for all four. Only one component, the ﬁrst liquidity factor, has a negative sign
(moving towards higher risk). We are thus conﬁdent that the regressions are not picking23
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up spurious movements in only one component of the Z-Score. Furthermore, we check
the leverage, deﬁned as total liabilities over total assets, of the savings banks’ commercial
borrowers. We ﬁnd that the customers on average reduced leverage after the removal of
public guarantees, in line with a reduction of credit supply from savings banks. Overall,
the results turn out to be robust to diﬀerent regression setup, diﬀerent sample selection
criteria, omitting 2000/2001 from the analysis, and decomposing the Z-Score measure of
credit risk.
While we feel reasonably conﬁdent that the results above indeed are driven by
the removal of guarantees, their identiﬁcation relies only on time series variation in the
behavior of savings banks. It is possible that all banks reduced their risk taking after
2001. If this were the case, the eﬀect of the removal of government guarantees would
be confounded by a general time series trend. In the next section we examine this by
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation, using diﬀerent control groups. At this stage, however,
it seems useful to brieﬂy examine the overall economic developments in Germany around
the removal. As shown in Figure 2, Germany experienced a recession in 2002/2003. This
suggests an overall decline in the quality of the pool of potential borrowers. Despite this
decline in the quality in the pool of potential borrowers, we ﬁnd an improvement in the
quality of the accepted borrowers for the savings banks.
We further ﬁnd that the savings banks’ market share in lending to commercial
borrowers decreased after the removal of the public guarantees. Figure 3 suggests that
savings banks’ market share was relatively stable at around 22% before 1999. Then we
observe an increase of around 1.5% in the years 1999 and 2000. That might have been
an anticipation of the forthcoming regulatory change. In the years 2001 and (to a lesser
extend) 2002, we observe a drop to around 20% and after that a stable market share of
around 21%. The removal of state guarantees thus corresponds to a lower market share of
savings banks. The chart suggests that savings banks changed their lending behavior in
2002-2006 more than their competitors, which were not aﬀected by the removal of public24
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guarantees.
Both trends are consistent with the idea that savings banks reduced risk taking in
2002 to 2006, but may also be consistent with a ”ﬂight to safety” in the face of a recession
unrelated to changes in public guarantees. In order to address this concern, we show the
results for attempts at identifying the eﬀect of public guarantees in the cross-section as
well as the time series.
5.2 Higher ex ante value of guarantees
In this section we identify the eﬀect of the removal of government guarantees using a
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach. We would expect that the eﬀects on the behavior of
savings banks should be larger if the value of the government guarantees to the savings
banks was larger ex ante. We identify the value of ex ante guarantees on the basis of
risk taking before the removal of the guarantee. If the guarantee resulted in moral hazard
eﬀects, their removal should result in a stronger reaction for those banks that incurred
greater risk with the guarantee in place. If the charter value eﬀect dominates, we would
not necessarily expect a diﬀerence in the reaction of ex ante riskier and ex ante safer
banks.19 We measure the ex ante riskiness of the savings bank as the average Z-Score of
their borrowers before the removal of government guarantees. To identify the diﬀerence
in reaction we deﬁne two groups of savings banks: HighRisk is a dummy variable equal
to one if savings banks have below average Z-Score before 2001 and zero otherwise, while
LowRisk is a dummy variable equal to one if savings banks have above average Z-Score and
zero otherwise. The key identifying assumption for this diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach
to yield causal eﬀects is that customers of both groups of savings banks exhibited the
same trend in the absence of treatment (”parallel trends assumption”, see e.g. Angrist
and Pischke, 2009). In our setting, this implies that the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the Z-score, loan
sizes and interest rate spreads charged of low risk and high risk savings banks between
19Reasons for the cross-sectional variation in risk taking among savings banks in the presence of guarantees could be for
example managerial preferences as in Bertrand and Schoar (2003).25
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1996 and 2000 are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one another. We test this accordingly
and ﬁnd that the assumption is satisﬁed.
Table 4 presents the univariate results. We observe a stronger increase in the
average Z-Score after the removal of government guarantees for ex ante riskier banks
(0.29) compared to ex ante less risky banks (0.08). The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences is 0.21
(signiﬁcant at the 1% level). In addition, the decrease of the average loan volume was
stronger for riskier (Euro 106,000) than for safer banks (Euro 59,000). The diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences is negative but not signiﬁcant. The average interest rate spread was raised
more strongly (132 basis points compared to 80 basis points). The resulting diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences (52 basis points) is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
In line with the univariate analysis, we estimate the following equation for Z Score(i,t)
Loan size(i,t), and Interest rate spread(i,t) simultaneously using a SUR model as before:
Y (i,t)=α + β1 NoStateGxHighRisk(g,t)+β2 NoStateGxLowRisk(g,t)
+ β3 StateGxLowRisk(g,t)+γ1 X1(g,t)+γ2 X2(i,t)+γ3 X3(t)+ε(i,t). (2)
where Y (i,t) represents the three dependent variables at the borrower level i. The
key variables are the three interaction terms. We are interested in the change in lending
behavior before (StateG) and after (NoStateG) the removal of government guarantees for
the savings bank groups with lower (LowRisk) and higher (HighRisk) ex ante riskiness.
We thus base our inference on β1 -( β2 - β3). All control variables are deﬁned as in equation
(1).
The results in Table 5 show that the reduction in risk, the reduction in loan size,
and the increase in interest rate spreads were all larger for savings banks which carried
a higher credit risk before the removal of state guarantees. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
terms enter signiﬁcantly for credit risk (at the 1% level) and interest rate spread (at the
5% level) while the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences is negative but insigniﬁcant for loan size. Ex26
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ante riskier banks appear to have reduced their risk taking more after the removal of
guarantees relative to ex ante safer banks.
6 Control group of banks unaﬀected by the removal and market
discipline
In this section we identify the eﬀect of the removal of guarantees using a second diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences approach. We use a control group of German non savings banks that were
not aﬀected by the removal of government guarantees (the treatment) in order to control
for changes over time that are common to all banks in Germany. As in Section 5.2,
the central assumption for the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation to yield causal eﬀects
is the parallel trends assumption: savings banks (the treated group of banks) and the
control group of banks (the untreated group of banks) should exhibit a common trend
in the absence of treatment. Again, unreported results indicate that the assumption is
satisﬁed.20
6.1 Data
We start with a brief description of the control data set. The control group includes all
non-savings banks available for Germany in Bankscope, including bank holding companies,
commercial banks, cooperative banks, and medium and long term credit banks. The
control sample ultimately consists of 877 banks in 1995 - 2006 after excluding observations
with missing values for the variables used in the empirical analysis. Unfortunately, for the
control group we cannot link banks to their customers, which implies that we have to
calculate indicators of risk at the bank level (see below). We combine the control group
with the 452 savings banks (treatment group) to generate a data set with 1,329 banks for
1995 - 2006.
20Note that we cannot formally test for the parallel trend assumption for the bank level Z-Score and return on asset
volatility, as for both we need several years to calculate return on asset volatilities and therefore do not have several
non-treatment years to compare trends.27
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On average the size of the control group banks and the savings banks tends to be
similar with the average savings bank at Euro 1.8 billion total assets and the average
control group bank at Euro 2.2 billion in total assets. However, the size variation is much
smaller for savings banks, as the largest savings bank is just below Euro 30 billion of total
assets, while the largest bank in the control sample has more than Euro 500 billion of total
assets.21
6.2 Risk taking
We ﬁrst check whether the borrower level baseline ﬁndings regarding the change in risk
taking after the removal of public guarantees hold at the bank level. We concentrate on
the bank level Z-Score which measures the distance from insolvency for a particular bank
(Laeven and Levine, 2009). As before, a higher Z-Score indicates a lower default risk.
The bank level Z-Score is deﬁned as (ROAA + CAR)/σ(ROAA) where σ(ROAA)i st h e
standard deviation of the average return of assets, E stands for equity, and A for total
assets.22 The latter two are used to calculate the capital assets ratio (E/A = CAR).
ROAA and CAR are both averages for the six years before and the six years after the
removal, respectively. σ(ROAA) is calculated using the six years before and six years
after the removal, respectively. We require available data for the years 1995 to 2006 for
all variables and thus have two observations for each bank in our sample.23
The ﬁrst column of panel A of Table 6 reports the bank level Z-Score before (1995-
2000) and after (2001-2006) the removal of public guarantees for savings banks. We use
the natural logarithm of the bank level Z-Score because it is highly skewed (Laeven and
Levine, 2009). The Z-score is 3.18 before the removal and 3.68 after the removal. The
diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at any signiﬁcance level and conﬁrms the borrower level results
21Recall that the descriptive statistics reported earlier referred to saving bank groups (necessitated by the maintenance
of conﬁdentiality of customers when matching them to savings banks), while the statistics here refer to individual savings
banks.
22We winsorize the raw data on the 0.5%/99.5% level.
23We require at least three observations in each subperiod. All results remain qualitatively unchanged if we use diﬀerent
sample selection criteria.28
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that savings banks reduced credit risk after the removal of government guarantees. This
result remains qualitatively unchanged if we run a regression using the same controls
averaged over the two periods (before/after) used in Section 5.1. The forth column of
the table shows the bank level Z-Score of the control sample. In the control group the
bank level Z-score decreases from 4.26 before to 3.62 after the removal. In contrast to the
savings banks, the control sample increased risk levels after the removal of government
guarantees. Savings bank behave fundamentally diﬀerent from the control group after the
removal of the guarantees. It is important to emphasize that these results suggest that
after the removal of guarantees bank level Z-scores of savings banks and the control group
converged, suggesting similar risk taking across the two sets of banks after the removal of
guarantees.
As an alternative to the bank level Z-Score, Panel A of Table 6 also shows the
change in the standard deviation of return of average assets, σ(ROAA). Column 2 shows
a σ(ROAA) for the savings banks of 0.23% before and 0.16% after the removal. In contrast,
the ﬁfth column shows the σ(ROAA) for the control sample. For the control sample, we
observe a signiﬁcant increase from 0.14% to 0.29% after the removal.24
If savings banks reduced the extension of credit to risky borrowers, we should be
able to detect this in overall loan volumes of banks. Hence, we compare the total loan
volume before and after the removal of public guarantees for the savings and the control
group. Column 3 shows a slight decrease from Euro 0.54 to Euro 0.51 billion for the
savings banks. The diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant. Column 6 shows in the control group
loan volume increased from Euro 0.60 to Euro 0.75 billion. Again, the diﬀerence is not
statistically signiﬁcant.
We are concerned that these diﬀerences may at least in part be driven by unobserved
bank level heterogeneity. Hence, we combine the samples of savings banks with the control
group and run the following bank ﬁxed eﬀects diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences regression:
24Results have the same direction and are also highly signiﬁcant if we use the standard deviation of the average return of
equity instead.29
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Y (k,t)=A(k)+β1 NoStateG(t)+β2 NoStateGxSB(k,t)+ε(k,t) (3)
where Y (k,t) represents one of the dependent variables Banking Z Score, σ(ROAA),
and Loan volume. A(k) are the bank ﬁxed eﬀects (k denotes the bank level). The variable
of interest, NoStateGxSB, equals one for savings banks after the removal of government
guarantees (2001-2006) and zero otherwise. Panel B of Table 6 shows the results. We ﬁnd
that NoStateGxSB enters signiﬁcantly positive in the bank level Z-Score regression in
column 1 (at the 1% level). Savings banks reduced their risk taking relative to the control
group after the removal of public guarantees. Column 2 results conﬁrm that savings banks
signiﬁcantly reduced earnings volatility compared to the control group (at the 1% level).
Finally, in column 3 we show that savings banks signiﬁcantly decreased the loan volume in
contrast to non savings banks (at the 1% level). This ﬁnding is in line with the declining
market share of savings banks depicted in Figure 3.
The results indicate that the control group increased their risk taking after the
public guarantees for savings banks were removed. This stands in stark contrast to the
savings banks, which reduced risk taking and lowered loan volumes. Taken together with
the earlier ﬁnding that savings banks that ex ante beneﬁted more from the public guarantee
reduced their risk taking more, the ﬁnding further lends support to a causal relationship
between the removal of guarantees and the reduction in risk taking of savings banks.
6.3 Market discipline
In the previous section, we document the economically signiﬁcant reduction in risk taking
of savings banks after the removal of guarantees. This section investigates whether we
can ﬁnd direct evidence that savings banks in doing so reacted to tightening market
discipline. We examine whether savings banks adjusted their liabilities consistent with
stronger monitoring by risk-sensitive debt holders and we check whether interest rate30
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spreads of savings bank bonds reacted around the time of the announcement that the
guarantees were removed.
If market discipline had indeed inﬂuenced savings banks to reduce risk taking after
the removal, we would expect the following patterns in liabilities of savings banks. One,
savings banks increased their capital, as investors pushed savings banks towards more
capital as a cushion against future losses. Second, they increased reliance on deposits, be-
cause deposits were still covered by deposit insurance even after the removal of guarantees.
Third, we would expect to observe reduced reliance on risk-sensitive (non-deposit) debt,
because the remuneration on this source of ﬁnancing can be expected to react particularly
strongly to the removal of guarantees.
We analyze the changes in the structure of liabilities using the same sample of bank
level observations for savings banks and the control group as in the previous section. We
examine the capital to assets ratio (CAR), the deposit ratio, and the ratio of risk-sensitive
debt. Denoting customer deposits as D, the deposits ratio equals D/A. The risk-sensitive
debt ratio is deﬁned as (A - E - D)/A. Panel A of Table 7 presents the univariate results.
Column 1 shows that the CAR increased from 4.3% before the removal to 5.2% after the
removal for savings banks. The change is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The control group,
however, also increased capital from 5.7% before to 6.4% after the removal (column 4).
This change is also signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Hence at the univariate level, we cannot
attribute the change in capital to the removal of public guarantees. Further we ﬁnd that
savings banks increased the deposit funding from 60.0% to 62.8% (column 2, signiﬁcant at
the 1% level) while there is no change for the control group (column 5). Similarly, column
3 shows that savings banks signiﬁcantly decreased reliance on risk-sensitive debt by 3.8%
to 32.0% (at the 1% level)), while for the control group there is no change during the same
time period (column 6).
As before, we next control for unobserved bank level heterogeneity by including
bank ﬁxed eﬀects in a set of regressions combining savings banks and the control group31
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1272
December 2010
(Panel B of Table 7). We ﬁnd results consistent with a signiﬁcant adjustment of liabilities
by savings banks towards equity and insured deposits and away from risk-sensitive debt.
This adjustment is signiﬁcantly stronger than in the control group. The diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences terms are signiﬁcant at least at the 5% level in all three regressions.
We next check whether the removal of public guarantees of savings banks is reﬂected
in bond yield spreads of outstanding savings bank bonds around the time of the announce-
ment of the removal on July 17, 2001. If so, this would be direct evidence that market
participants adjusted their default expectations regarding savings banks in response to
the removal of public guarantees. Again we make use of a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences set up
by comparing changes in savings bank bonds yield spreads to changes in yield spreads
of the bonds issued by the control group of banks. We use yield spread data of traded
unsecured debt around the ﬁnal removal decision which took place on July 17, 2001, for
all savings bank bonds available in Bloomberg or Datastream. For bonds issued by the
control group we impose that the bonds issued are larger than Euro 50 million. We cal-
culate yield-to-maturities (YTM) over the risk-free YTM as yield spreads. The risk-free
YTM was obtained from the Bundesbank. We ﬁrst collect daily YTM data and require
all bonds to have non-missing values in the 12 weeks before and the 12 weeks after the
announcement of the removal on July 17, 2001. The relatively wide event window is the
result of the need to keep a reasonable sample size in light of relatively infrequent trading
of many savings bank bonds and sparse data for 2001 in our data sources. Ultimately we
were able to obtain data on 81 bonds issued by 29 savings banks and 112 bonds issued by
18 banks of the control sample. We then compute the average weekly yield spread using
the daily data. Column 1 of Table 8 shows the yield spread changes for the bonds issued
by savings banks. The average weekly spread increased from 45 to 51 basis points. This
increase is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. In contrast, the yield spreads of the bonds issued
by the control group decreased from 108 to 106 basis points during the same period. The
diﬀerence is insigniﬁcant. The results from the event study are consistent with an upward32
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revision of default probabilities of savings banks by market participants.25
Overall, we ﬁnd evidence – both from ﬁnancial statement and bond market data
– that market discipline played a role in explaining the decreased risk taking by German
savings banks after the removal of public guarantees.
7 Further results
7.1 Introduction of risk based regulation and prompt corrective action
We want to be sure that the eﬀects we describe above are indeed due to the removal of
guarantees and not due to subsequent changes in the regulatory framework. Each savings
bank in Germany is required to contribute to a regional support fund. In December 2003
(two years after the removal of guarantees) it was announced that the contributions to
the fund would be changed from ﬂat contributions to risk based contributions based on
the portfolio risk of each savings bank. The volume of the fund was also increased. Fi-
nally a risk monitoring system was introduced and intervention rights of the fund were
strengthened. The fund can ask savings banks to provide further details on its exposures,
it may set up meetings with the board of directors and management of the savings bank
and a restructuring of the aﬀected savings bank can be imposed. The reforms, which
became eﬀective in 2006, can be viewed as introducing a form of prompt corrective ac-
tion. Interestingly, these reforms of the fund were motivated by the removal of the public
guarantees.26
While the implementation of these reforms took place in 2006, the last year of our
sample period, we want to make sure that the changes in bank behavior were not due to the
expectation of these regulatory changes becoming eﬀective. It is possible that by dividing
the time period into 1996 to 2000 and 2001 to 2006, we mistakenly attributed eﬀects
25All results are robust to using daily data instead of weekly data and diﬀerent event window deﬁnitions.
26See for example Sparkassenzeitung (Werner, 2005): ”With the removal of the public guarantees...the support fund takes
on greater importance due to a change in risk perception of savings banks” (translation from German by the authors).33
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that occurred due to the announcement of the introduction of changes in the regulatory
framework in December 2003 to the removal of public guarantees. Hence, in the results
reported in Table 9, we divide the sample into three sub-periods:
• 1996/2000: Government guarantees are in place (StateG)
• 2001/2003: Guarantees no longer in place, no risk based regulation
• 2004/2006: Guarantees no longer in place, risk based regulation announced (IntroRW)
Dividing the sample in this way highlights that we can identify the eﬀect of the
removal of government guarantees by considering the change in risk taking in 2001/2003
relative to 1996/2000 (StateG). However, we cannot unambiguously attribute any further
eﬀects (the coeﬃcient IntroRW for the 2004/2006 period) to either the removal of guar-
antees or the introduction of regulation, as this period will reﬂect a combination of both
eﬀects. Still, it seems interesting in its own right to check whether after 2003 there were
additional eﬀects on bank risk taking. Hence, we estimate the SUR model
Y (i,t)=α + β1 StateG(t)+β2 IntroRW(t)+γ1 X1(g,t)+γ2 X2(i,t)+γ3 X3(t)+ε(i,t) (4)
where Y (i,t) again represents the three dependent variables on the borrower level,
Z Score(i,t), Loan size(i,t), and Interest rate spread(i,t). The ﬁrst variable of interest
in the results for this exercise is StateG. The results in Table 9 show that savings banks
reduced their risk taking in 2001/2003 as StateG is negative in the ﬁrst column. We further
ﬁnd that the borrowers’ loan sizes (column 2) were reduced and the interest rate spreads
charged (column 3) were increased signiﬁcantly. All three coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the
1% level. The eﬀect of the removal of government guarantees on risk taking is robust to
controlling for the subsequent introduction of risk based regulation and prompt corrective
action.34
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The results also suggest that savings banks reduced their risk taking further in
2004/2006 (IntroRW is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level), although we do not ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant eﬀect for loan size and interest rate spreads. Overall, we would interpret the
evidence as suggestive that risk based regulation reduced risk taking further, although
we cannot fully distinguish the eﬀect from a potential late adjustment to the removal of
government guarantees.
7.2 Screening versus monitoring
Our matched bank/borrower data set provides a direct possibility to investigate whether
banks changed their screening or their monitoring policies or both. In order to disentangle
screening from monitoring, we create two sub samples of our borrower level data set. One
includes only new and the second only existing borrowers. Figure 4 shows how we deﬁne
the two sub samples. It illustrates ﬁve exemplary borrowers of a given bank. We ﬁrst
exclude all observations for 1995 (denoted in Figure 4 with B), because for 1995 we are
unable to distinguish whether the observations refers to an existing or a new borrower.
That is the case for borrower 2 and 3 in Figure 4. Second, if we observe a borrower in
1995 and 1996 or a subsequent year, we deﬁne this observation as “existing” (E). Third,
if we observe a borrower for the ﬁrst time in 1996 or any subsequent year, we classify the
borrower as “new”, denoted with N in Figure 4. Subsequent observations of this same
borrower would then be included in the set of existing borrowers. To disentangle screening
and monitoring eﬀects, we further exclude existing borrower observations for borrowers
for which we do not have observations before and after the removal of public guarantees.
Thus, we drop existing observations that are marked by ’e’ in the ﬁgure, i.e. for borrowers
1, 4 and 5.
In order to examine whether the adjustment in credit quality of the banks primar-
ily came about through changes in screening or changes in monitoring, we compare the
changes in Z-Scores for these two sub samples. The results are presented in Table 10. We35
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observe a change towards higher Z-Scores (corresponding to a reduction in risk) both for
new and for existing borrowers after the removal of the guarantees. The average credit
quality of new and of existing borrowers is higher for each annual observation after the
removal of guarantees than for any observation before removal. This further strengthens
our earlier ﬁndings. However, the increase is stronger for new (0.49) than for existing
borrowers (0.13). The diﬀerence between the diﬀerences of 0.37 is statistically signiﬁcant
at the 1% level. Overall, we ﬁnd that banks both dropped riskier existing borrowers (mon-
itoring) and tightened lending standards for new borrowers (screening), with a stronger
emphasis on tightening standards for new borrowers.
8 Conclusion
The results in this paper show that government guarantees are associated with strong
moral hazard eﬀects. The approach taken in the paper permits a unique identiﬁcation
of the causal eﬀect of government guarantees on bank risk taking. One, the removal of
guarantees was exogenously imposed on the sample banks. The change in the safety net
that we examine was unrelated to a ﬁnancial incident, but rather based on a European
court decision. Second, the banks in the sample are small and, therefore, unlikely to be
“too big to fail”. Hence, we can exclude the possibility that explicit government guarantees
were simply replaced by implicit guarantees, which may have similar eﬀects on bank risk
taking and also be associated with moral hazard (Gropp et al., 2010). Third, the data
permit a link between the balance sheet information of the banks and the balance sheet
information of their commercial loan customers. Savings banks largely operate along
traditional banking lines with little oﬀ-balance sheet operations. Hence, we are able to
measure their risk taking comprehensively by examining the Z-Score of their commercial
loan customers.
We ﬁnd that the removal of government guarantees not only signiﬁcantly decreased36
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the risk taking of banks, but we also show that after the removal of guarantees, banks
reduced average loan size and overall lending volume. At the same time, banks increased
interest rates for loans on the remaining borrowers. The eﬀects are economically substan-
tial: Z-Scores increased on average by 7.5%, loan sizes declined by 17.2%, and interest rate
spreads increased by 46 basis points. We ﬁnd that these eﬀects tend to be signiﬁcantly
larger for banks, where it is likely that the ex ante value of guarantees was higher.
Using a control group of non savings banks that was unaﬀected by the removal
we ﬁnd that, compared to savings banks, these banks increased their risk taking and
their loan volume after the guarantees for savings banks were removed. Furthermore, we
ﬁnd evidence for market discipline since savings banks changed their reﬁnancing structure
towards a higher ratio of (insured) deposits and a lower ratio of risk-sensitive debt in-
struments after the removal while we do not observe these changes for the control group.
Yield spreads of savings banks’ bonds increased upon the announcement of the decision
to remove the guarantee, while the yield spread of bonds issued by the control group
remained unchanged.
In light of the extensive public guarantees extended in the wake of the recent ﬁ-
nancial crisis, the ﬁndings of this paper have important policy implications: The results
suggest that a credible removal of guarantees will be essential in reducing the risk of po-
tential future ﬁnancial instability. They also support recent initiatives to impose capital
surcharges on the largest banking institutions, which may beneﬁt either from an explicit
or an implicit guarantee (e.g. Swiss TBTF Commission of Experts, 2010). Higher capital
in these banks may help oﬀset the incentives provided by the public guarantees imposed
during the crisis.37
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FIGURE 1: Distribution of Z-Scores before and after the removal of public guarantees
The ﬁgure shows the distribution of the Z-Score before (1996-2000) and after (2001-2006) the removal of
government guarantees. The Z-Score is deﬁned in Table 1. We use univariate kernel density estimation






























FIGURE 2: Economic developments in Germany
The ﬁgure shows annual GDP growth in Germany during our sample period. Data are taken from the


























Working Paper Series No 1272
December 2010
FIGURE 3: Market share of savings banks in Germany
The ﬁgure shows the annual loan volume of savings banks as a percentage of the total loan volume to






















FIGURE 4: Sample selection - Screening versus monitoring
The ﬁgure shows how we deﬁne the two sub samples of new and existing borrowers used for Table 10.
It illustrates ﬁve exemplary borrowers of a given bank. All observations for 1995, denoted by B, are
excluded. If we observe a borrower in 1995 and 1996 or a subsequent year, we deﬁne this observation as
“existing” (E). If we observe a borrower for the ﬁrst time in 1996 or any subsequent year, we classify the
borrower as “new”, denoted with N. Subsequent observations of this borrower are classiﬁed as existing
borrower (E). We only include those existing borrowers for which we have observations before and after
the removal of public guarantees in 2001. Those borrower-year observations are denoted “E” (borrowers 2
and 3). Observations of existing borrowers 1, 4, and 5 are denoted “e” and are excluded from our analysis.
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TABLE 3: Impact of the removal of government guarantees - Multivariate analysis
The table shows the result of a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model which simultaneously esti-
mates the impact of the removal of government guarantees on credit risk (Z Score), loan size, and interest
rate spreads on the borrower level. NoStateG equals 0 before 2001 and 1 for the years of 2001 - 2006.
The control variables are savings bank assets on the group level, Total bank assets, the downgrade of
the federal state bank, Downgrade, the debt per capita per group of savings banks, Indebtedness, the
absolute level of local GDP per capita, GDP per capita, the relative change of the business climate in
Germany, Δ Ifo index, the branches of direct competitors (commercial banks and cooperative banks) to
savings banks branches per group of savings banks, Direct competition, the number of mergers within
the group of savings banks per year, Number mergers, and the average daily interest rate in basis points,
Risk-free interest rate. All speciﬁcations include two-digit industry dummies (coeﬃcients omitted from
the table). Standard errors are clustered at the savings banks’ group level. *,**,*** indicate signiﬁcance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Independent variables Z Score Loan size Interest rate spread
NoStateG 0.176*** -0.100*** 0.460***
Total bank assets 0.001 0.001 0.003
Downgrade 0.050** 0.01 -0.307**
Indebtedness -0.204*** -0.035 0.146
GDP per capita 0.016*** 0.003 0.102***
Δ Ifo index 0.013*** -0.002* -0.042***
Direct competition -0.295*** 0.042 -0.457
Number mergers -0.003 -0.009 -0.103
Risk-free interest rate -0.022** 0.022*** -0.701***
Intercept 1.855*** 0.234*** 4.302***
Observations 230,562 230,562 230,562
Adj.R2 0.104 0.080 0.015
TABLE 4: Ex ante value of guarantees - Univariate analysis
The table shows the results of a univariate analysis of the impact of the removal of government guarantees
on credit risk (Z Score), loan sizes (in millions of Euros), and interest rate spreads (in percent). The
sample includes 230,562 observations of commercial borrowers. Government guarantees were in place in
1996-2000, and government guarantees were not in place in 2001-06. High/low ex ante risk stands for
savings banks below/above average Z-Score prior to removal of guarantees. The diﬀerences in column
3 show a comparison before and after the removal of government guarantees. In column 3, *,**,***
indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, using univariate OLS with standard
errors clustered at the savings bank group level.
Variable Before the removal After the removal Diﬀerence
Z Score
Overall 2.36 2.56 0.20***
Low ex ante risk 2.57 2.65 0.08**
High ex ante risk 2.17 2.46 0.29***
Loan size
Overall 0.582 0.504 -0.078***
Low ex ante risk 0.602 0.543 -0.059
High ex ante risk 0.565 0.459 -0.106***
Interest rate spread
Overall 5.94 7.06 1.12***
Low ex ante risk 6.53 7.34 0.81***
High ex ante risk 5.43 6.75 1.32***47
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TABLE 5: Ex ante value of guarantees - Multivariate analysis
The table contains the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences result of a SUR model regression which analyzes the impact
of removal of government guarantees in dependence on the ex ante value of guarantees for the following
variables: credit risk (Z Score), loan size, and interest rate spread on the borrower level. We approximate
the ex ante value of guarantees by the ex ante risk taking of savings banks. The control variables are
deﬁned as in Table 3. Wald tests for the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences terms are reported at the bottom of the
table. All speciﬁcations include two-digit industry dummies (not reported). Standard errors are clustered
at the savings banks’ group level. *,**,*** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Independent variables Z Score Loan size Interest rate spread
(1) NoStateGxHighRisk 0.282*** -0.120*** 0.740***
(2) NoStateGxLowRisk 0.406*** -0.056 0.827**
(3) StateGxLowRisk 0.322*** 0.016 0.638**
Total bank assets 0.001 0.001 0.003
Downgrade 0.050** 0.010 -0.306**
Indebtedness -0.146** -0.017 0.218
GDP per capita 0.011** 0.002 0.094***
Δ Ifo index 0.013*** -0.001 -0.041***
Direct competition -0.178** 0.074 -0.296
Number mergers 0.005 -0.009 -0.088
Risk-free interest rate -0.025** 0.022*** -0.707***
Intercept 1.660*** 0.206*** 3.967***
Diﬀerence (1) 0.282*** -0.120*** 0.740***
Diﬀerence (2)-(3) 0.084** -0.072* 0.189
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (1)-[(2)-(3)] 0.198*** -0.048 0.552**
Observations 230,562 230,562 230,562
Adj.R2 0.106 0.081 0.01548
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TABLE 8: Market discipline - Yield spread changes
The table compares the yield spreads before and after the removal of public guarantees. We deﬁne the
week of the ﬁnal removal decision, July 17, 2001, as event. We use yield-to-maturities (YTM) over the
risk-free YTM as yield spreads. We employ Datastream and Bloomberg data for the bond YTM and
Bundesbank data for the risk-free YTM. We ﬁrst collect daily YTM data and require all bonds to have
non-missing values in the 12 weeks before and the 12 weeks after the removal. We then compute the
average weekly yield spread using the daily data. The ﬁrst (second) line provides the average weekly yield
spread in percent for the 12 weeks before (after) the removal. We test the yield spread diﬀerences by an
univariate OLS regression with standard errors clustered at the issuer level. The third last line shows the
respective p-value.
Savings bank Non savings bank
Before the removal 0.4463 1.0845
After the removal 0.5073 1.0595
Diﬀerence 0.0610 -0.0250
P-value 0.0220 0.7490
Number of bonds 81 112
Number of issuers 29 18
TABLE 9: The introduction of risk based regulation and prompt corrective action
The table contains the result of a SUR model regression which analyzes the introduction of risk weighted
provisions for the group-wide reserve funds in the year 2004 on credit risk (Z Score), loan size, and interest
rate spread on the borrower level. We use two dummy variables which indicate the periods 1996-2000
(StateG) and 2004-06 (IntroRW) and exclude as reference category the period 2001-03. The control
variables are deﬁned as in Table 3. All speciﬁcations include two-digit industry dummies (not reported).
Standard errors are clustered at the savings banks’ group level. *,**,*** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%,
5% and 1% level, respectively.
Independent variables Z Score Loan size Interest rate spread
StateG -0.125*** 0.102*** -0.497***
IntroRW 0.151*** 0.006 -0.112
Total bank assets 0.001 0.001 0.002
Downgrade 0.049** 0.01 -0.306**
Indebtedness -0.198*** -0.035 0.142
GDP per capita 0.015*** 0.003 0.103***
Δ Ifo index 0.008*** -0.002** -0.038***
Direct competition -0.256*** 0.044 -0.486
Number mergers 0.009 -0.008 -0.112
Risk-free interest rate 0.01 0.023*** -0.725***
Intercept 1.847*** 0.127 4.897***
Observations 230,562 230,562 230,562
Adj.R2 0.104 0.080 0.01551
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TABLE 10: Screening versus monitoring
The table shows the average Z-Scores per year for newly approved borrowers (ﬁrst column) and existing
borrowers (second column). We require at least three observations per borrower and thus use a diﬀerent
sample compared to Tables 2 to 5 and 9. The sample selection process is illustrated in Figure 4. The
results are broken down into two regimes. Panel A displays the years before while Panel B shows the
years after the removal of government guarantees. We test the diﬀerences between the average Z-Scores
before (1) and after the removal (2) by using an univariate OLS regression with standard errors clustered
at the savings bank group level. The last line reports the p-value of the corresponding Wald test. *,**,***
indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Average Z-Score
Year New borrowers Existing borrowers






(1) Average 3.09 2.83







(2) Average 3.59 2.96
Diﬀerence (2) - (1) 0.49*** 0.13***
t-statistic (6.27) (5.39)
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences 0.37***
P-value, Wald test (0.0001)Working PaPer SerieS
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